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Abstract. In this work we address the issue of the uncertainty faced by a user par-
ticipating in multiagent debate. We propose a way to compute the relative relevance
of arguments for such a user, by merging the classical argumentation framework
proposed in [5] into a game theoretic coalitional setting, where the worth of a col-
lection of arguments (opinions) can be seen as the combination of the information
concerning the defeat relation and the preferences over arguments of a “user”. Via
a property-driven approach, we show that the Shapley value [15] for coalitional
games defined over an argumentation framework, can be applied to resume all the
information about the worth of opinions into an attribution of relevance for the sin-
gle arguments. We also prove that, for a large family of (coalitional) argumentation
frameworks, the Shapley value can be easily computed.
Keywords. Argumentation, Coalitional games, Multiagent systems
1. Introduction
A multiagent debate can be seen as a collective gathering of arguments, possibly con-
strained by the rules of a protocol, whose outcome will eventually be evaluated (for
instance thanks to the formal tools provided by argumentation theory [5,8]). A central
problem faced by agents contributing in such a multiagent debate is that they have to put
forward arguments taking into account their own goals, but also how the audience (the
other agents taking part in the debate) may receive their arguments, and also possibly
whether the rules of the debate will allow them to put forward these arguments. Consider,
for instance, the attitude of politicians participating to public debates: their choice to em-
brace arguments or opinions, often depends by factors like, for instance, the popularity
of the arguments, the share of voters supporting those opinions, a degree of personnel
satisfaction, the consensus generated by those opinions in an assembly or in a forum, the
contiguity with a political position, etc.
This results in complex decision-making problem, where most of the parameters are
likely to be uncertain: what are the arguments known by other agents? what are their own
goals? etc. Perhaps the most basic type of uncertainty is that it is virtually impossible to
1This work benefited from the support of the project AMANDE ANR-13-BS02-0004 of the French National
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exactly predict what combination of arguments will result from the debate. In particular,
even though full knowledge of the other agents’ goals and arguments is assumed, the
exact deadline of the debate may still be unknown, for instance. In this work, we thus
investigate more specifically the uncertainty regarding the debate, and propose to exploit
cooperative game theory to account for the decision-problem faced by an agent in this
context.
We focus on the argumentation framework introduced in [5], where a set of argu-
ments are represented by the nodes of a directed graph whose edges express the attacks
or conflicts between pairs of arguments. Since the seminal paper [5], several authors have
introduced and studied different notions of acceptability for arguments, assigning to each
argument the status of ‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’, which is perhaps a simplistic manner to
compare arguments in decision-making applications. Recently, few studies [1,3,4,11] at-
tempted to evaluate intermediate levels of acceptability, using very different approaches.
For example, in [11], a two-player strategic game between a ‘proponent’ and an ‘oppo-
nent’ is considered, where the strategies of the players are subsets of arguments, and the
payoffs of the game are based on the structure of the directed graph associated to the
argumentation framework.
Combining preferences and argumentation outcomes has been proposed initially in
[14] and used in many work since. In this paper, we assume that the user has a cardinal
preference relation over single arguments. From preferences over singleton arguments,
it is possible to induce a preference order on the outcome of the debates (that is, sets of
accepted arguments). For instance, I may prefer outcomes which make my favourite ar-
gument acceptable, regardless of whether many less preferred arguments are discarded.
There are of course several ways to define such a preference ordering, and we discuss
different ways to lift up preferences over subsets (i.e. coalitions) of arguments in our con-
text. In fact, the way to combine the information about preferences and defeat relations
within each coalition of arguments can be specified by the user according to different
criteria, ranging from the pure and simple consideration of the exogenous user’s prefer-
ences over opinions (disregarding the conflicts among arguments), to the other extreme
where all arguments are indifferent for the user, and the notion of the worth of an opinion
is exclusively based on the definition of argumentation semantics. Interestingly, in the
latter case, the measure of importance for arguments provided by the Shapley value of
the associated coalitional game, can be interpreted as a novel measure of acceptability,
and can be compared with the existing notions from the related literature [1,3,4,11] (this
comparison will be further discussed in future work). Intermediate coalitional argumen-
tation frameworks, based on the combination of the users’s preferences with a local (or
myopic) observation of the abstract argumentation framework, are also considered.
The notion of audience is also not new: several authors have integrated this com-
ponent in their favourite argumentation setting, see [2]. Basically, this means that the
beliefs (or the preferences) of the other agents are considered. Recently, Grossi and van
der Hoek [6] proposed an inspiring model, where agents are uncertain about the audi-
ence they face (the belief of the other agents). Based on this, they study how “adequate”
are games, that is, roughly speaking, whether they are fair to both parties. Importantly,
their approach takes into account the constraints imposed by the protocol. Our approach
differs in that we address a related question (what is the best move to do) with a different
tool —cooperative game theory— in order to compute the contribution of arguments to
the satisfaction of the user.
To sum up, in this work, we thus introduce a framework for abstract argumentation,
keeping into consideration the preferences over (collection of) arguments of an agent
(hereafter, called “the user”), who deals with the problem of assessing the relevance of
each argument with respect to her/his own objectives, and facing the uncertainty about
which combination of arguments will result from the debate. The final goal of this paper,
is then to measure the relative importance of arguments for the user, taking into account
both her/his own preferences - as represented by a utility function defined over the set
of arguments - and the information provided by the attack relations among arguments.
In this direction, we merge the classical argumentation framework proposed in [5] into
a game theoretic coalitional setting [13], where the “worth” of a collection of arguments
(also called an opinion) can be seen as the combination of the information about the
preferences of the user over arguments and the information concerning the conflicts be-
tween the arguments. In addition, classical power indices for coalitional games (in par-
ticular, the Shapley value [15]) are used to resume all the information about the worth of
opinions into an attribution of relevance (or priority) for the single arguments.
The paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 with some basic definitions
about abstract argumentation and coalitional games. Section 3 is devoted to the presen-
tation of a coalitional argumentation framework, where a family of coalitional games
is used to represent the worth of coalitions of arguments, and where the Shapley value
of such games is re-interpreted as a measure of the relevance of arguments. Section 4
introduces a (myopic) coalitional argumentation framework, where the worth of an opin-
ion is additive over non-attacked arguments, and the computation of the Shapley value
is simple. In Section 5 we provide an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value in
the class of games introduced in Section 4.2. Section 6 deals with an extended notion of
coalitional argumentation framework aimed to capture the uncertainty generated by an
interaction protocol for multi-agent debates.
2. Basic notions and definitions
2.1. Argumentation framework
A Dung Argumentation Framework (DAF) is a directed graph 〈A,R〉, where the set of
nodes A is a finite set of arguments and the set of arcsR⊆A×A is a binary defeat (or
attack) relation (i.e, (i, j) ∈ R means that argument i ∈ A attacks argument j ∈ A). We
say that a set of arguments S⊆A (also called an opinion S) attacks another opinion T ⊆
A in 〈A,R〉 if there exists (s, t)∈ S×T with (s, t)∈R, that is an attacks which originates
from an argument in S and is directed against an argument in T . For each argument a we
define the set of predecessors of a in 〈A,R〉 as the set Pr(R,a) = { j ∈ A : ( j,a) ∈R},
and the set of successors of a is denoted by Su(R,a) = { j ∈ A : (a, j) ∈ R} (if clear
from the context, we omit notationR in Pr(i) and Su(i)).
The main goal of argumentation theory is to identify which arguments and opinion
are rationally “acceptable” according to different notions of acceptability. Some of the
most common ones are the following. An argument a ∈A is said acceptable w.r.t. S⊆A
iff ∀b ∈ A: if (b,a) ∈ R, then ∃c ∈ S such that (c,b) ∈ R. A set S ⊆ A is said to be:
(conflict-free) iff S does not attack itself; (stable) iff S is conflict-free and attacks every
argument inA\S; (admissible) iff S is conflict-free and S attacks every argument in T \S
that attacks S; (preferred) iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. ⊆) admissible extension; (complete)
iff ∀a ∈ A, if a is acceptable w.r.t. S, then a ∈ S; (grounded) iff S is the minimal (w.r.t.
⊆) complete extension.
2.2. Coalitional games
A coalitional game, also known as characteristic-form game or Transferable Utility (TU)
game, is a pair (N,v), where N denotes a finite set of players and v is the characteristic
function, assigning to each S⊆N, a real number v(S)∈R, with v( /0)= 0 by convention. If
the set N of players is fixed, we identify a coalitional game (N,v) with the corresponding
characteristic function v. A group of players T ⊆N is called a coalition and v(T ) is called
the worth of this coalition. We will denote by G the class of all coalitional games. Let C ⊆
G be a subclass of coalitional games. Given a set of players N, we denote by CN ⊆ C the
class of coalitional games in C with N as set of players. We define the set ΣN of possible
linear orders on the set N as the set of all bijections σ : N → N, where σ(i) = j means
that with respect to σ , player i is in the j-th position. For σ ∈ ΣN , the marginal vector
mσ (v) ∈RN is defined by mσi (v) = v({ j ∈ N : σ( j)≤ σ(i)})−v({ j ∈ N : σ( j)< σ(i)})
for each i ∈ N.
A one-point solution (or simply a solution) for a class CN of coalitional games is a
function ψ : CN → RN that assigns a payoff vector ψ(v) ∈ RN to every coalitional game
in the class. The Shapley value φ(v) of a game (N,v) is then defined as the average of
marginal vectors over all |N|! possible orders in ΣN (|N| is the cardinality of the set N).
In formula
φi(v) = ∑
σ∈ΣN
mσi (v)
|N|! for all i ∈ N. (1)
An alternative representation of the Shapley value for each i ∈ N is by the formula
φi(v) = ∑
S⊆N\i
1
|N|(|N|−1|S| ) (v(S∪ i)− v(S)). (2)
We recall some nice properties of the Shapley value of a cost game v: efficiency (EFF),
i.e.∑i∈N φi(v) = v(N); symmetry (SYM), i.e. if v(L∪{i}) = v(L∪{ j}) for all L⊂N such
that i, j ∈ N \L, then φi(v) = φ j(v); dummy player property (DPP), i.e. if i ∈ N is such
that v(L∪{i})− v(L) = v({i}) for all L⊆ N, then φi(v) = v({i}); additivity (ADD), i.e.
φ(v)+φ(w) = φ(v+w) for each v,w ∈ CN . It is well known that the Shapley value is the
only solution that satisfies these four properties on the class CN [15].
3. Coalitional argumentation framework
We define a Coalitional Argumentation Framework (CAF) as a triple 〈A,R,v〉 where
〈A,R〉 is a DAF and v is a map assigning to each opinion S ⊆ A a number v(S) ∈ R.
The value v(S) represents the worth of the opinion S for the user (for example, it could
measure the success provided by opinion S according to a criterion specified by the user,
e.g., the popularity of the opinion). We assume that for each a ∈A, the worth (or utility)
of the singleton {a} is given by a (cardinal) preference relation over A.
In the following, we also assume that a CAF 〈A,R,v〉 satisfy the following condition
of compatibility between the map v and the DAF 〈A,R〉: (c.1) if a ∈ A is such that
Pr(a) = Su(a) = /0 (a is not connected to other arguments in 〈A,R〉), then v(S∪{a}) =
v(S) + v({a}) for each opinion S ⊆ A; (c.2) if a,b ∈ A are such that Pr(a) = Pr(b)
and Su(a) = Su(b) (i.e., a and b are symmetric in the DAF) and v({a}) = v({b}), then
v(S∪{a}) = v(S∪{b}) for each opinion S⊆A.
Given a CAF 〈A,R,v〉 (satisfying conditions (c.1) and (c.2) as well), we study the
problem of providing a measure representing the relevance of arguments, taking into
account both the structure of the DAF and the worth of opinions as measured by v. In
this direction, we focus on properties that such a measure of relevance should satisfy.
For instance, the SYM2 property introduced in Section 2, states that two symmetric
players in the DAF should have the same relevance, provided that their worth as single-
tons is the same (differently stated, the relevance of an argument does not depend from its
label). Analogously, rephrasing the notion of dummy player in a CAF, the DPP says that
disconnected arguments in a DAF should receive as value of relevance precisely their
worth as singletons. Still, the EFF property imposes un upper bound over the scale for
measuring the relevance of arguments (precisely, the sum of the relevance values must
be equal to v(A)). Finally, an interesting reinterpretation of the ADD property suggests
that the sum of the relevance values measured over two distinct CAFs 〈A,R,v1〉 and
〈A,R,v2〉 sharing the same DAF (for instance, v1 ande v2 may represent the success
of opinions over two distinct populations, like women vs. men), should be equal to the
degree of admissibility of arguments measured on 〈A,R,v1 + v2〉.
Example 1. Consider two CAFs, 〈{1,2,3},{(1,2),(2,1)},v〉 and 〈{1,2,3}, {(1,2),(2,1)},v′〉
(satisfying conditions (c.1) and (c.2) as well).
Consider the CAF 〈{1,2,3},{(1,2),(2,1)}, v¯ = v+v′〉. By ADD and DPP, the Shap-
ley value of argument 3 is φ3(v¯) = v({3}) + v′({3}), and by SYM and EFF, φ1(v¯) =
φ2(v¯) = 12 (v(A)+ v′(A)− (v({3})+ v′({3}))).
This specific interpretation of properties satisfied by the Shapley value, has the merit
to better contextualize and support the use of the Shapley value as a meaningful measure
of the relevance of arguments in a CAF. On the other hand, in order to compute such a
measure, the nature of the worth of opinions, as represented by map v in a CAF, should
be further specified. If we completely ignore the information provided by the directed
graph in a CAF, and we assume that the worth of opinions is additive over the worth of
the singletons (i.e., v(S) = ∑i∈S v({i}), for each S ⊆A), then it is easy to check that the
Shapley value of each argument i equals v({i}). On the other hand, the objective of this
work is to apply the machinery of coalitional games to combine the user’s preferences
over arguments with the defeat relation of a DAF, and a possible approach to tackle this
problem is illustrated in Section 4.
2Notice that, given a CAF 〈A,R,v〉, there may exist arguments a and b that are symmetric players in v
(according to definition provided in Section 2) that do not necessarily satisfy the condition Pr(a) = Pr(b),
Su(a) = Su(b) and v(a) = v(b) introduced in condition (c.2). In a similar way, there may exist arguments a∈A
that are dummy players in v that do not satisfy condition Pr(a) = Su(a) = /0.
4. Combining preferences and conflicts
As we previously mentioned, the definition of the worth of a set of arguments may de-
pend on multiple factors. First of all, the combination of the information about prefer-
ences and the attack relation can vary from the unique consideration of the user’s prefer-
ences over opinions (disregarding the conflicts among arguments), to the other extreme
where all arguments are indifferent for the user, and the notion of the worth of an opinion
is exclusively based on the definition of argumentation semantics.
We can thus see the level of consideration of the argumentation system in a scale,
from no acknowledgement at all to a total consideration, as shown in Table 1 and dis-
cussed in the following sections.
Consideration of the argumentation framework:
not at all (game vo) partial (game vˆ) total (game v∗)
The worth of an opinion S is additive:
over all arguments of S (Section
4.1)
over the non-attacked arguments
in S (Section 4.2)
over the arguments in the
grounded extension of the DAF
restricted to S (Section 4.3)
Table 1. Levels of combinations of the preference relation and the DAF.
4.1. No consideration of the acceptability
We consider here a very basic example, where the user is only interested on his/her
preference over arguments, and does not care about the attack relation existing between
those arguments. Precisely, consider a CAF 〈A,R,vo〉 where the worth of opinions is
additive over the arguments, i.e.
vo(S) =∑
i∈S
vo({i}),
for each S⊆A (by convention, vo( /0) = 0). So, the worth of an opinion S is measured as
the sum of the worth of the single elements of S.
Example 2. Consider the CAF 〈{1,2,3},R,vo〉, such that the user’s preference over the
arguments is given by vo({1}) = 0, vo({2}) = −1, vo({3}) = 1. As the attack relation
has no effect on the evaluation of the arguments, we do not need to precise it. The game
vo is provided in Table 2. The Shapley value of such a game is φ1(vo) = 0, φ2(vo) =−1
and φ3(vo) = 1.
S : {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
vo(S) : 0 −1 1 −1 1 0 0
Table 2. The worth of each coalition S⊆ {1,2,3} in vo.
As the Shapley value of each argument is the same as its cardinal utility, this game
has no particular interest. However, taking into account the constraints induced by a
protocol (as discussed in Section 6) could already make such a setting non-trivial.
4.2. Partial consideration of acceptability
We now focus on the case where the argumentation system is partially taken into account.
As a particular example, we define here a notion of the worth of opinions combining
the preferences of the user over single arguments and a “local” information about the
attacks. Precisely, consider a CAF 〈A,R, vˆ〉 where the worth of opinions is additive
over non-attacked arguments, i.e. if an opinion S ⊆ A forms, vˆ(S) denotes the sum of
the worth of single arguments that are not attacked within opinion S. Let FS = {i ∈ S :
{i} is not attacked by S\{i}} be the set of non-attacked arguments in S, then
vˆ(S) = ∑
i∈FS
vˆ({i}), (3)
for each S ⊆A (by convention, vˆ( /0) = 0). So, the worth of an opinion S is measured as
the sum of the worth of those single elements of S that are not attacked in S. We denote
by VˆA the class of CAFs 〈A,R, vˆ〉 onA introduced in this section, and by GVˆA the class
of corresponding games defined by relation (3).
Example 3. Consider the CAF 〈{1,2,3},{(1,2),(2,3)}, vˆ〉, such that the preference
over each argument i is the same and is equal to 1. The game vˆ is provided in Table 3.
The Shapley value of such a game is φ1(vˆ) = φ3(vˆ) = 12 and φ2(vˆ) = 0. So the greatest
relevance is given to arguments 1 and 3 (note that the opinion {1,3} is the only stable
one).
S : {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
vˆ(S) : 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Table 3. The worth of each coalition S⊆ {1,2,3} in vˆ.
Alternatively, suppose that the argument 2 is preferred to the other ones, and thus
the worth of opinion 2 is, for instance, vˆ({2}) = 1, and vˆ({1}) = vˆ({3}) = 0. Now the
relevance assigned by the Shapley value is 12 to arguments 2, 0 to argument 3, and − 12
to argument 1: the user would be worse off by attacking the most beneficial and non-
defended argument 2, whereas she/he would receive no detriment in adopting argument
3.
In general the Shapley value is hard to calculate, since it requires a number of oper-
ations that is exponential in the number of arguments. However, for the specific class of
CAFs introduced in this section, it is possible to calculate the Shapley value easily. First,
observe that a game vˆ can be decomposed as the sum
vˆ = ∑
i∈A
vˆ({i})uˆi,Pr(i) (4)
where, for each i ∈ A and each S⊆A\{i},
uˆi,S(T ) =
{
1 if i ∈ T and S∩T = /0
0 otherwise, (5)
for each T ⊆A.
Remark 1. Consider a game (A, uˆi,S) defined according to relation (5), with i ∈ A and
S⊆A\{i}. Notice that 〈A,R, uˆi,S〉 is an element of VˆN , with R= {( j, i)| j ∈ S}, that is
the set of attacksR is formed by the attacks of arguments in S to i.
In order to prove that the Shapley value of a game vˆ is easy to calculate, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. The Shapley value of game (A, uˆi,S), with i ∈A and S⊆A\{i}, is such that
φk(uˆi,S) =

1
s+1 if k = j,
1
s(s+1) if k ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
(6)
for each i ∈ A and where s = |S| (with s = 0 if S = /0).
Proof. By the DPP property, we immediately have that φk(uˆi,S) = 0 for each k ∈A\ (S∪
{i}). By relation (1), the S¡hapley value of argument i is the ratio between the number of
permutations σ ∈ ΣA in which σ(i)< σ( j) for each j ∈ S, denoted by n(s+1), and the
total number of permutations a!, with a = |A|. However, it is easy to check that such a
ratio does not depend on the number of arguments in A\ (S∪{i}) (to see this, it suffices
to notice that for each fixed permutation in σS,i ∈ ΣS∪{i} of elements in S∪{i}, the total
number of permutations in ΣA that preserve the ordering σS,i is a constant K(n− s−1)).
Then, we have that φi(uˆi,S) = n(s+1)a! =
s! K(n−s−1)
(s+1)! K(n−s−1) =
1
s+1 , where s! is precisely the
number of permutations σS,i ∈ ΣS∪{i} in which σS,i(i) = 1. Finally, if S 6= /0, by properties
EFF and SYM it follows that φk(uˆi,S) = uˆi,S(A)− 1s(s+1) =− 1s(s+1) for each k ∈ S.
Proposition 1. Consider a CAF 〈A,R, vˆ〉 ∈ VˆA. Then the Shapley value of game (A, vˆ)
is
φi(vˆ) = v({i})|Pr(i)|+1 −∑ j∈Su(i) v({ j})|Pr( j)|(|Pr( j)|+1) , (7)
for each i ∈ A.
Proof. The proof immediately follows by relation (4) and the ADD property.
Note that the Shapley value of an argument i in game vˆ does not depend only on the
number of predecessors (attackers) an argument has, but also on the number of succes-
sors (arguments attacked by i), and on the number of other attackers of the arguments at-
tacked by i. An axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value on the class of the CAFs
presented in this section is discussed in Section 5.
Example 4. Consider a CAF 〈A = {1,2,3,4,5,6},R = {(1,2),(2,1),(2,3), (3,4),
(5,3),(6,5)}, vˆ〉, and such that vˆ({i}) = 1 for each i ∈ A. Using relation (7), we have
that the Shapley value of game vˆ is (0,− 16 ,− 16 , 12 , 13 , 12 ). Hence, φ4(vˆ) = φ6(vˆ)> φ5(vˆ)>
φ1(vˆ) > φ2(vˆ) = φ3(vˆ). As in Example 3, arguments with the highest Shapley value are
conflict free.
For a comparison, we recall here that the ranking provided by the method introduced
in [3,4] in the DAF 〈A,R〉 is 6  4  1 ∼ 2  5  3, whereas the ranking provided by
the method in [11] is 6 1∼ 2∼ 4 3 5.
4.3. Total consideration of acceptability
It is also possible to take into account the information provided by a DAF in a more
explicit way, for example by means of the definition of a coalitional game based on the
acceptability semantics. For instance, we could consider the coalitional game
v∗(S) = ∑
i∈ES
v∗({i}),
where ES is the grounded extension in the argumentation framework 〈S,RS〉, where
RS = {(i, j) ∈R : i, j ∈ S} is the set of attacks between arguments in S.
Example 5. Consider the CAF 〈{1,2,3},{(1,2),(2,3),(3,2)},v∗〉, such that the worth
of each singleton opinion {i} is the same and equal to 1. The game v∗ is provided in the
Table 4, together with the grounded extensions corresponding to each DAF 〈S,RS〉. The
Shapley value of such a game is φ1(v∗) = 76 , φ2(v
∗) = 16 and φ3(v
∗) = 23 . As expected,
the higher Shapley value is for argument 1, which is not attacked in the DAF. Moreover,
argument 3, which defends itself against argument 2, has a higher value than 2, which
cannot defend itself against 1.
S : {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
ES : {1} {2} {3} {1} {1,3} /0 {1,3}
v∗(S) : 1 1 1 1 2 0 2
Table 4. The grounded extension and the worth of each coalition S⊆ {1,2,3} in v∗.
Alternatively, suppose that the user likes argument 2, dislikes argument 3 and is
neutral with respect to argument 1. A possible choice of the worth of each singleton
opinion representing this situation is 0 for argument 1, 1 for argument 2 and −1 for 3.
In this new situation, φ1(v∗) = − 12 , φ2(v∗) = 12 and φ3(v∗) = −1. Note that although
argument 1 is neutral to the user, its relevance is negative since it can only do some harm
to coalitions the user likes.
5. An axiomatic characterization
In this section we provide an axiomatic characterization of a solution in the specific class
of coalitional games arising from CAFs in VˆA, as introduced in Section 4.2. For this
purpose, we define a solution as a map ψ : GVˆA→ RA. An interesting property for an
index is the following.
Axiom 1 (Equal Impact of Attack). Let 〈A,R, vˆ〉 ∈ VˆA and i, j ∈A, with i 6= j. Let vˆi j be
the game in the CAF 〈A,R∪{(i, j)}, vˆi j〉 ∈ VˆA with vˆi j({k}) := vˆ({k}) for each k ∈ A.
A solution ψ : GVˆA→ RA satisfies the property of Equal Impact of Attack (EIA) iff
ψi(vˆ)−ψi(vˆi j) = ψ j(vˆ)−ψ j(vˆi j).
Property of EIA states that when a new attack between two argument i and j is
added to (or removed from) a CAF, then the relevance of the two arguments should be
affected in the same way. Differently stated, this property says that a consequence of
an attack should be detrimental for both arguments involved in the defeat relation, since
an attacks always decreases the worth of coalitions containing the involved nodes. The
following proposition shows that the Shapley value of a game corresponding to a CAF
〈A,R, vˆ〉 ∈ VˆA satisfies the EIA property.
Proposition 2. The Shapley value satisfies the EIA property (in the class of games GVˆA).
Proof. 〈A,R, vˆ〉 ∈ VˆA and i, j ∈A, with i 6= j. Of course the interesting case is (i, j) /∈R.
Define the game vˆi j as in Axiom 1. We have that
φi(vˆ)−φi(vˆi j)
=
(
v({i})
|Pr(R,i)|+1 −∑k∈Su(R,i) v({k})|Pr(R,k)|(|Pr(R,k)|+1)
)
−
(
v({i})
|Pr(R∪{(i, j)},k)|+1 −∑k∈Su(R,i)∪{ j} v({k})|Pr(R∪{(i, j)},k)|(|Pr(R∪{(i, j)},k)|+1)
)
= v({ j})(|Pr(R, j)|+1)(|Pr(R, j)|+2) ,
where the first equality follows by Proposition 1 and the fact that in the directed graph
R∪{(i, j)}, argument i has one more successor, i.e. argument j, and argument j has one
more predecessor, i.e. argument i (w.r.t. the directed graphR). In a similar way, we have
that
φ j(vˆ)−φ j(vˆi j)
=
(
v({ j})
|Pr(R, j)|+1 −∑k∈Su(R,i) v({k})|Pr(R,k)|(|Pr(R,k)|+1)
)
−
(
v({ j})
|Pr(R, j)|+2 −∑k∈Su(R,i) v({k})|Pr(R,k)|(|Pr(R,k)|+1)
)
= v({ j})|Pr(R, j)|+1 − v({ j})|Pr(R, j)|+2 = v({ j})(|Pr(R, j)|+1)(|Pr(R, j)|+2) ,
where the first equality follows by Proposition 1 and the fact that in R and R∪{(i, j)}
argument j has the same set of successors, but one more predecessor (w.r.t. the directed
graphR).
We can now introduce the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. The Shapley value is the unique solution that satisfies EFF, SYM, DPP, ADD
and EIA properties on the class GVˆA.
Proof. The Shapley value satisfies EFF, SYM, DPP, ADD properties on each coalitional
game, and by Proposition 2, it also satisfies EIA on the class GVˆA.
Now, take a solution ψ : GVˆA→ RA that satisfies EFF, SYM, DPP, ADD and EIA
properties. Consider a game (A, uˆi,S) defined according to relation (5), with i ∈ A and
S⊆A\{i}. We first prove that ψ(uˆi,S) = φ(uˆi,S). The proof is by induction to |S|.
If |S| = 1, then S has a unique element, say k ∈ A, k 6= i. For each j ∈ A\{i,k},
by the DPP we have that ψ j(uˆi,{k}) = 0. By the EIA property ψi(uˆi, /0)−ψi(uˆi,{k}) =
ψk(uˆi, /0)−ψk(uˆi,{k}). By DPP, we have that ψi(uˆi, /0) = 1 and ψk(uˆi, /0) = 0 for each k ∈A,
k 6= y. By EFF and DPP, we have that ψi(uˆi,{k})+ψk(uˆi,{k}) = 0. All these conditions
together imply that ψi(uˆi,{k}) = 12 and ψk(uˆi,{k}) =− 12 . So, ψ(uˆi,{k}) = φ(uˆi,{k}).
Now let m ∈ N, m ≥ 2 and suppose that the ψ(uˆi,S) = φ(uˆi,S) has been proved for
every S with |S| ≤ m− 1. Consider a coalition S′ = S∪{k}, with k ∈ A\ (S∪{i}) and
|S′|= m. By DPP, ψ j(uˆi,S′) = 0 for each j ∈ A\ (S∪{i,k}). In addition, we have that
0 = ψi(uˆi,S)−ψi(uˆi,S′)−ψk(uˆi,S)+ψk(uˆi,S′) = 1(s+1) −ψi(uˆi,S′)+ψk(uˆi,S′), (8)
where the first equality follows by the EIA property and the second equality follows by
the induction hypothesis. Moreover,
0 = ∑ j∈S∪{i,k}ψ j(uˆi,S′) = ψi(uˆi,S′)+(s+1)ψk(uˆi,S′), (9)
where the first equality follows by EFF and DPP, and the second one by SYM. Combin-
ing relations (8) and (9), we have that ψk(uˆi,S′) = 1(s+1)(s+2) = φk(uˆi,S′) and ψi(uˆi,S′) =
1
s+2 = φi(uˆi,S′), which implies, by the application of the induction hypothesis, that
ψ(uˆi,S) = ψk(uˆi,S) for every i ∈ A and S⊆A\{i}.
Using relation (4) and the additivity of ψ , we have that ψ(vˆ) = ψ(vˆ) for each vˆ ∈
GVˆA, which concludes the proof.
6. Protocols for debates under uncertainty
In Sections 3, a property-driven approach has been used to support the adoption of the
Shapley value as a measure of the relevance of arguments. Consequently, the relevance
of an argument i ∈ A has been measured by its expected marginal contribution
ψi(v) = ∑
A⊆A\{i}
pi(S)(v(S∪ i)− v(S)), (10)
where the probability distribution pi is such that pi(S) = 1|A|(|A|−1|S| )
for each S⊆A\{i}.
On the other hand, in abstract argumentation, probabilities over arguments and opinions
may capture the uncertainty related to a specific argumentation framework [10,7], or the
uncertainty related to a set of rules of an interaction protocol for multi-agent debates
[12]. Therefore, it makes sense to consider “probabilistic” CAFs, where the information
concerning the probability that opinions form is given a priori, and such probabilities are
taken into account in the computation of the relevance via relation (10).
For example, consider a multi-agent interaction protocol where arguments are in-
troduced by agents one after the other, respecting the protocol’s rule according to which
an argument can be introduced at a certain stage of the debate only if it attacks or it
is attacked by another argument previously introduced. According to such a protocols,
we can assume that it is not plausible that all coalitions could be potentially considered,
since certain opinions will never form. Looking at the formula (1), this means that or-
ders inducing the formation of impossible opinions should not be taken into account,
and therefore should be deleted by the computation of the average marginal contribution
over the permutation set. Of course, such a removal of orders induces a new probability
distribution pi(S) in relation (10), for each i ∈ A and S ⊆A\{i}: the index obtained in
this way is the so-called “generalized Shapley value”, introduced in [9].
Example 6. Consider again the CAF of Example 3, and the multi-agent interaction
protocol described in this section. According to such a protocol, opinion {1,3} will never
form. Then, in formula (1), orders inducing the formation of opinion {1,3} should be
removed. Precisely, those orders to be deleted are 1,3,2 and 3,1,2. It is easy to check
that the generalized Shapley value of game vˆ (i.e., the average marginal contribution
of arguments over the remaining orders) is 14 for argument 1,
1
2 for argument 2 and
1
4
for argument 3: notice that player 2 has now the highest relevance. The probabilistic
value induced by the uncertainty generated from the interaction protocol has inverted
the relative ranking of relevance over arguments, with respect to the CAF introduced in
Example 3.
However, the computation of the generalized Shapley value implies the consider-
ation of all the orderings of the elements in A, and therefore is computationally very
expensive, even on small instances. A possible alternative could be the application of
simpler probability distributions in relation (10). In this direction, one could think of us-
ing a uniform probability distribution over collections of feasible opinions (i.e., a notion
of “generalized Banzhaf value”), or of applying methods aimed to approximate the ex-
pected marginal contribution over feasible coalitions. These aspects and other computa-
tional issues are discussed in a longer version of this manuscript.
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